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Jon Williamson, In Defence of Objective Bayesianism. Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 2010, Pp. vi + 185, ISBN
978-0-19-922800-3.
Reviewed by Hykel Hosni, Scuola Normale Superiore, Pisa and Centre
for Philosophy of Natural and Social Science, London School of Economics,
London. Email: h.hosni@gmail.com
The aim and spirit of Jon Williamson’s In Defence of Objective Bayesian-
ism are effectively summarised by the author as follows:
This book is written in the belief that it is better to con-
tribute to the struggle to state and defend the right position
than to settle for a more easily defensible position that is
only a part of the story. (p.163)
According to Williamson, the “right position” is deeply rooted in com-
monsense: “if someone’s evidence leaves the truth or falsity of θ open, then
she would be irrational to strongly believe θ or its negation”. In spite of
its intuitive appeal, a number of attempts at formalising this idea turned
out to be unsatisfactory, with some leading to well-known paradoxes. The
book under review takes up the two-fold challenge of articulating “the right
position” in full formal detail and defending the ensuing principle of Maxi-
mum Entropy against a number of objections, old and new. The essence of
Williamson’s defence strategy is to entrench the principle in a foundationally
robust framework – Objective Bayesian Epistemology (OBE).
The defence articulated throughout the book under review addresses ob-
jections of a practical and of a foundational kind. The former are mainly
focussed on the applicability of OBE methods in uncertain reasoning and
decision-making. The latter question the status of OBE as a suitable nor-
mative framework for the representation of rational behaviour under un-
certainty. The foundational criticisms addressed in this book may in turn
be divided into anti-Bayesian and intra-Bayesian according to whether they
take issue with Bayesianism tout court or with (some of) the specific prin-
ciples which define OBE.
My opinion is that In Defence of Objective Bayesianism largely succeeds
in meeting the practical and the anti-Bayesian criticisms it takes into ac-
count. As to the intra-Bayesian objections, I think Williamson is perhaps
too defensive in excluding interval-valued probabilities as suitable candi-
dates for norms of rational belief. Just as Williamson shows that subjective
Bayesianism relies on essentially the same arguments which support OBE,
his justification for measuring uncertainty with single-valued probabilities
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2doesn’t appear to be so obviously inapplicable to the interval-valued case.
Before I articulate this in some detail, let me briefly overview the contents
of this particularly dense book.
Chapters 1-3 set up the stage by spelling out Williamson’s characterisa-
tion of OBE. Given the author’s overall aim it is not surprising that this
part accounts for nearly one half of the book. In Chapter 1 Williamson lists
the criticisms that he will address and delimits the scope of his investiga-
tion, namely a normative account of rational, evidence-based, propositional
degrees of belief. The first part of Chapter 2 provides a compact but quite
detailed historical account of Bayesianism “[f]rom Jakob Bernoulli to Ed-
win Jaynes”. Whilst tracing the roots of OBE, Williamson points out how
each of the three main interpretations of probability, namely the subjective,
the physical and the logical, contributed –often by way of endorsing spec-
tacularly radical positions– to the implicit consolidation of three norms of
rational belief. The second part of Chapter 2 provides an explicit formu-
lation of such norms: Probability, Calibration and Equivocation. Chapter
3, the longest in the book, is devoted to motivating them, leading to a full
characterisation of OBE. Chapters 4-9 develop the necessary technical back-
ground to address specific counter-arguments to a number of foundational
and practical criticisms. OBE turns out to be generally inconsistent with
Bayesian updating, one of the cornerstones of standard Bayesian theory.
Chapter 4 points out that when OBE and conditionalisation diverge, it is
Bayesian conditionalisation that offers the weaker answer to the problem
of formalising the dynamics of rational belief. This is Williamson’s most
radical departure from standard Bayesianism. Chapter 5 extends the char-
acterising norms of OBE to predicate languages. This material provides a
very useful addition to predicate probability logic, an area of mathematical
logic for which there is currently an important revival of interest. Chapter
6 shows the applicability of OBE to Bayesian Nets. This chapter addresses
one of the most prominent practical criticisms to OBE, namely that Max-
imum Entropy reasoning is too computationally demanding to be useful in
artificial intelligence. Williamson counters this objection by showing how
the framework of Objective Bayesian Nets (OBNET) leads to efficient Max-
ent reasoning and how this resulted in successful real-world implementations
of OBNET. Two further applications of OBE are discussed in Chapters 7
and 8, namely as a semantics for probability logic and as a framework for
evidence-based social decision making. Chapter 9 provides a formulation of
OBE in the language of measure-theoretic probability. This richer language
is argued to be too general for the purposes of OBE, which therefore is best
framed in the structure provided by logical languages. Chapter 10 concludes
by setting the agenda for future research in OBE.
3It is apparent from this abridged list of themes that In Defence of Ob-
jective Bayesianism has a decidedly multidisciplinary appeal and should
be of great interest to logicians, epistemologists, statisticians, computer-,
cognitive- and social scientists. In addition to this, Williamson’s norm-based
characterisation of OBE puts uncertain reasoning into a uniform founda-
tional perspective. This is, in my opinion, the central contribution of the
book.
De Finetti, easily the most radical exponent of the subjective approach to
Bayesian theory, insisted that (finite) additivity is the only constraint that
can be normatively imposed on a rational agent’s degrees of belief. Additiv-
ity leads to coherence, which for him and other subjectivists, notably Savage,
captures the logic of subjective rationality: Coherence prevents individuals
from making blatant mistakes, but otherwise grants them maximum flexi-
bility in the expression of those degrees of belief which –in their opinion–
reflect most accurately their information, experience, confidence, personal-
ity, and so on. This form of subjectivism certainly does not require agents to
disregard evidence –including statistical information– nor does it deny that
vast interpersonal agreement can emerge among Bayesian reasoners. What
de Finetti does deny though is that conformity to those OBE requirements
should have normative force.
Let me recall the OBE norms in slightly more detail. The Probability
Norm demands that rational agents’ degrees of belief should conform to the
laws of probability. The Calibration Norm requires that the subjective prob-
abilities licensed by the Probability Norm should be based on the agent’s
qualitative and quantitative evidence, including causal and logical relations,
known frequencies or, if these make sense in the specific case of interest,
single-case physical probabilities. Finally, the Equivocation Norm further
refines the choice of degrees of belief by excluding extreme probability val-
ues unless these are being prescribed by the previous norms, and subject to
this requirement, it constrains probabilities to be otherwise minimally prej-
udiced, or equivalently, maximally equivocal. Williamson shows (Chapter
3) that Probability, Calibration and Equivocation are individually justified
by appealing to formal variations of essentially the same argument which
involves the minimisation of a certain loss function. The gist of the argu-
ment can be described as follows. Provided that an individual is faced with
a suitably defined choice problem, each of the three above norms can be
justified by showing that contravening them would increase the agent’s ex-
pectation of incurring a loss (possibly in the long run). Hence the framework
subjective Bayesians have long used to articulate and defend their position,
effectively provides a justification for objective Bayesianism. This leads to
4the ironic conclusion that if you think of yourself as a subjective Bayesian
then you might have a very hard time objecting (consistently) to OBE.
I find Williamson’s norm-based characterisation of OBE very compelling
and I feel persuaded by most of his specific arguments in defence of it. A sig-
nificant exception, as anticipated above, is his criticism of the interval-valued
extension of standard Bayesianism, to which I now turn. Williamson con-
siders various interpretations of interval-valued partial belief and concludes
that single-valued OBE is overall better justified. After criticising some
non-Bayesian approaches to probability intervals, notably the one based
on Kyburg’s evidential probability, Williamson addresses in Section 3.4.7
two main lines of intra-Bayesian criticism which are labelled “pragmatic
and conceptual” (p.70), respectively. As to the former, Williamson main-
tains that interval-valued degrees of belief are “harder to obtain and work
with” than their point-valued counterparts. There is no doubt about this
–complication is hardly a surprise when expressive power increases. Yet he
goes on to suggest –and this brings us to his “conceptual” criticism– that the
cost of extending the formal apparatus of Bayesian theory to interval-valued
probabilities may not be balanced by an adequate gain in expressive power.
This is where I disagree with Williamson. His argument is in fact three-
fold, but essentially pivots on the observation that “the interval approach
[. . . ] weakens the link between belief and decision” (p. 70). There are
several levels at which this objection can be spelled out and, consequently,
addressed, but I think it suffices to remain at the level of interpretation.
Walley’s approach to imprecise probabilities, which Williamson recalls at
various points, is grounded in decision-theoretic principles of admissibility
which can be construed as natural adaptations of de Finetti’s coherence.
This requires a crucial fine-tuning of the betting scenario. In particular, in
the interval-valued case, gamblers cannot bet negative stakes whilst book-
makers can differentiate between buying and selling prices. Under this in-
terpretation, the real-valued interval [l, u] represents the supremum of the
buying price and the infimum of the selling price, respectively, for an event
of interest θ. The width of the interval can then be interpreted as express-
ing the ‘second-order uncertainty’ attitude of the agent with respect to their
willingness to bet on θ. Two extreme choices are noteworthy, namely [0, 1]
representing ‘unwillingness to bet’ and l = u capturing ‘willingness to bet at
fair odds’. Taking this ‘attitude’ into account in the quantification of a ra-
tional agent’s uncertainty leads to an increase in expressive power that need
not conflict with the norms of Bayesian epistemology. Indeed, building on
this interpretation Fedel et al. (2011) have defended the normative force of
a suitably adjusted criterion of coherence which accounts for Williamson’s
“second conceptual worry”, namely that whilst the betting interpretation
5underlying interval-valued probability is naturally more realistic, it has du-
bious normative force.
It goes without saying that Williamson cannot be held responsible for
not taking into account results which have appeared after the publication of
his book. The point of this ‘counter-objection from the future’ is therefore
limited to suggesting that his defence of OBE need not be incompatible,
at least in principle, with (the Bayesian interpretation of) interval-valued
norms of rational belief. Encouraging signals to the effect this might be the
case also in practice come from the recent literature on norms of rational de-
cision which develop the idea of weighing utility with interval-valued, rather
than point-valued, measures of rational belief (see, e.g. Troffaes, 2007). This
clearly suggests that much could be gained by grounding OBE in an Impre-
cise Probability Norm. Whilst a substantial amount of work will be required
to articulate a research programme along these lines, there is no doubt that
Williamson’s In Defence of Objective Bayesianism provides an indispensable
reference for anyone with an interest in tackling it.
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